Abstract. The Boxdot Conjecture is shown to hold for a novel class of modal systems. Each system in this class is K plus an instance of a natural generalization of the McKinsey axiom.
The Conjecture
In modal logic, the following translation, t, is the boxdot translation,
The name derives from the use of ⊡φ as a symbol for ◻φ ∧ φ in Boolos [1] . We continue the use of this symbol, and also use ⟐φ for φ ∨ φ.
Where K is the minimal normal modal logic, K⊕φ is the smallest normal modal logic containing φ. KT is K⊕ ◻φ → φ. In [3] , French This is the Boxdot Conjecture. French and Humberstone laid groundwork for future discussion and showed that the conjecture holds for all K⊕φ with φ of modal degree 1. As the authors point out, it is not difficult to show the converse of the conjecture is true, and also not difficult to show the conjecture holds for any extension of KT, yet it seems there is no clear path toward dealing with all other cases of the conjecture. In Steinsvold [4] , the conjecture was shown to hold for all K⊕G hijk , where h, i, j, k ∈ N, and
We use G hijk as an arbitrary instance of this axiom schema (an instance of the schema is given by a specific h, i, j, k). The 'G' is for Geach. Here we show the conjecture holds for K⊕M lmno where l, m, n, o ∈ N, and
We use M lmno as an arbitrary instance of this axiom schema (an instance of the schema is given by a specific l, m, n, o). 
This is our main result. The paper is organized as follows. We conclude this section with a description of our overall strategy. In Section 2 we use KM as an example to illustrate our method. In Section 3 we present various preliminary results. In Section 4, we present the models which will aid our strategy. The following sections deal with the essential cases, and we conclude with our main result in Section 7.
A formula is a boxdot formula if it is the translation of some formula. We use φ ⊡ and ψ ⊡ for arbitrary boxdot formulas. The following definition is novel and we use it to explain our strategy. The definition is a generalization of the notion of a surrogate (from [4] ).
It follows that an exterpolant for α → β is a theorem of K⊕ α → β. Call an exterpolant trivial if it is a theorem of K. Note that there is a single trivial exterpolant for every conditional α → β, namely → ⊺ (as K ⊢ → α, K ⊢ β → ⊺, t = , and t⊺ = ⊺). Our interest here lies with non-trivial exterpolants. As for the name 'exterpolant' itself, the informal idea is that an exterpolant seems like the opposite of an interpolant. Conditions (A) and (B) of definition 1.1 are the informal justification for our use of the word 'exterpolant' (in loose contrast to an interpolant, I, for C → D, where C → I and I → D are theorems)).
Our strategy is to construct exterpolants for each M lmno (∉ KT) and then show these exterpolants are not theorems of K. Using the following Lemma, we can then conclude the conjecture holds for each K⊕M lmno ( ⊆ KT).
Proof. Assume L ⊢ tφ and K ⊢ tφ. As mentioned in [3] , for all ψ,
To utilize an example from [4] , consider
This sentence is an exterpolant for p → ◻p. The antecedent and consequent are boxdot formulas, and
Thus by Lemma 1.2, the Boxdot Conjecture holds for K⊕ p → ◻p. Our overall strategy is similar to that of [4] , and the work there simplifies the work here, as there are infinitely many M lmno which are instances of G hijk . For instance, M 1002 =G 0120 (= ◻p → ◻ ◻ p). Thus, our strategy is as follows. For each M lmno ∉ KT, and also not an instance of some G hijk , we construct an exterpolant for M lmno which is not a theorem of K, then apply Lemma 1.2 to K⊕M lmno . A frame F is a pair ⟨W, R⟩ where W is a non-empty set and R ⊆ W × W . Members of W are worlds or points. A valuation V is a function from the set of propositional variables into the power set of W . M = ⟨W, R, V ⟩ is a model. We define truth in a model at a world as follows:
φ is valid in the model M iff φ is true at every world in M . φ is valid in the frame F iff φ is valid in every model based on F .
KM
We use KM ( K⊕ ◻ p → ◻ p ) as an example. First, observe that
, and so if ¬q 1 is true, the disjunct (p ∧ q 1 ) must be false. With this in mind consider the following theorem of K,
The antecedent implies (though is not equivalent to) the claim that at all possible worlds, either p and q 1 are both possible or p and q 2 are both possible, thus, either way, at all possible worlds p is possible (the consequent). Significantly, the antecedent is a boxdot formula which implies the antecedent of the McKinsey axiom. Now, take the contraposition of the theorem of K in (A), put in ¬p for p, r 1 for q 1 , and r 2 for q 2 . This yields:
Significantly, the consequent is a boxdot formula which is implied by the consequent of M. Since KM ⊢ M, from (A) and (B) we have:
Call this theorem of KM: e M ('e' for exterpolant). To complete our strategy with this example, we need to show K ⊢ e M . To see this, consider the following frame (arrows depicting the relation R),
And consider the model M on the frame above with the valuation:
The antecedent of e M is true at 0. That is,
For consider the disjunction within the scope of ⊡ in the antecedent,
The left disjunct is true at 0. For M, 0 ⊧ ¬q 1 , and since 0R1 and p ∧ q 1 is true at 1, M, 0 ⊧ (p ∧ q 1 ) (and thus M, 0 ⊧ ⟐(p ∧ q 1 )). Furthermore, the right disjunct is true at both 1 and 1. For q 2 is false at both 1 and 1, and since both 1 and 1 relate to 2 and p ∧ q 2 is true at 2, (p ∧ q 2 ) is true at both 1 and 1 (and thus ⟐(p ∧ q 2 ) is true at both 1 and 1). Thus the antecedent of e M is true at 0. Yet the consequent of e M is false at 0. That is,
For consider the disjunction,
The left disjunct is true at 0. For r 1 fails at 0, and since 0R1 and ¬p ∧ r 1 is true at 1, ⟐(¬p ∧ r 1 ) is true at 0. Furthermore, the right disjunct is true at 1 and 1. For r 2 fails at 1 and 1, and since both worlds relate to 2, and ¬p ∧ r 2 is true at 2, ⟐(¬p ∧ r 2 ) is true at both 1 and 1. Thus the consequent of e M is false at 0. Thus,
By Lemma 1.2, the Boxdot Conjecture holds for KM. Where M lmno ∉ KT, our strategy is to find exterpolants for each M lmno which are not theorems of K. Naturally, we use models to show these exterpolants are not theorems of K. Considering strategy, (it seems) there was a choice between complex models and simple exterpolants, or simple models and complex exterpolants. We go with the latter choice. We use a single frame for all models, and the models only differ in where p is true. e M is an exterpolant for M, and the exterpolants we use for other M lmno are variations on e M . We used five propositional variables to construct e M (viz. p, q 1 , q 2 , r 1 , and r 2 ). Due to our strategy, the larger the value of l, the larger the number of propositional variables we use to construct the antecedent of the exterpolant. Thus, consider M 2100 , i.e. ◻ ◻ p → p. The following is a theorem of K⊕M 2100 :
By our method, this is the exterpolant we construct for M 2100 .
Preliminary Theorems
The proofs of our first two Lemmas are left for the reader.
From Lemma 3.2 we have:
Proof. This is Lemma 4.8 of [4] .
, from 1 and 2, replacement.
The following is very useful.
, from 4 and Lemma 3.1.
, from 9 and 10, replacement.
all n ≥ 0, from 1 and Lemma 3.2.
From Lemma 3.8 we have:
The following Theorem is useful for each case. Note how the number of propositional variables (and disjuncts) increases in the antecedent as l increases. Thus, the number of propositional variables used is relevant to our strategy. Furthermore, which propositional variables used will also be relevant to our strategy (and is relative to the size of m). Exactly why this is strategic won't be clear until the next section. Suffice it to say, this minor complication will ultimately make it easier to uniformly show our exterpolants are not theorems of K. 
Proof. Assume l ≥ 0 and m ≥ 1.
using Lemma 3.6 l + 1 times together with repeated use of:
from 1 and Lemma 3.1.
We give three instances of Theorem 3.10 to illustrate how m and l determine which and how many propositional variables are used. If l = 0 then our instance is Lemma 3.6 where m = z = g. If l = 2 and m = 1 we have,
And if l = 1 and m = 4 we have,
The following will be useful for our first case. Essentially we are taking the contraposition of Theorem 3.10 and replacing the occurrences of q g with r i , and changing a number of other variables as well. 
Proof. Take the contraposition of Theorem 3.10, then substitute ¬p for p and r m , ... , r m+l for q m , ... , q m+l , and then change l to n, m to o, and g to i.
The Frame and the Models
We use one frame for all cases. The models only differ in where p is true, and where p is true depends on m. An illustration of the frame,Ḟ = ⟨Ẇ ,Ṙ⟩, is given below the following definition of the frame,
Each world inẆ bearsṘ to exactly two worlds.Ḟ = ⟨Ẇ ,Ṙ⟩ has a trellislike structure, exhibited as follows (arrows depictingṘ),
We now define models for the frame. Models are defined relative to m. The intention is to falsify the relevant formula (the exterpolant) at 0. Note that, for all of the following, the propositional variables in {q 1 , q 2 , ...} are treated differently than the ones in {r 1 , r 2 , ...}. Officially, the complete set of propositional variables is,
Thus inṀ m , each r i is true at one and only one world (namely i), and each q g is true at one and only one world (namely g). Thus the valuation of each r i and each q g is the same for all models (that is, regardless of the value of m). The valuation of p, in contrast, depends on m.
The following two Lemmas are simple and useful. 
Thus φ is true at either x + 1 or x + 1, and x relates to both. ThusṀ m , x ⊧ φ. The converse is similar.
Now, consider the sentence above, our induction hypothesis, and the following instance of Lemma 3.6:
By Modus Ponens we have:
is true at either c + 1 or c + 1, and from this we will derive a contradiction. By Lemma 4.5, we have:
Using Cor. 3.7, we have:
Since m ≥ 1, by Lemma 4.3, we have:
Since m ≥ 1, by Lemma 4.4 (and Cor. 3.9), we have:
Contradiction.
Where l, m, o ≥ 1 and n ≥ 0, our first case is,
No instance of this case is a theorem of KT. Consider a two world model where aRa, aRb, bRa, bRb, and V (p) = {a}. For all m, o ≥ 1, m p and o ¬p are both valid in the model. Thus, for all l, n ≥ 0, ◻ l m p and ◻ n o ¬p are valid in the model as well. Since the model is reflexive and KT is the logic of reflexive frames, no instance of this case is a theorem of KT.
Lemma 5.1. For all l, m, o ≥ 1 and n ≥ 0, We need to show that the sentence in the above Lemma fails at 0 inṀ m , and thus in particular that the consequent is false (by Theorem 4.6, given m ≥ 1, the antecedent is true for all l ≥ 0 at 0 inṀ m ). Considering the basic similarity between the antecedent and the negation of the consequent, our proof of this is not much different than our proof of Theorem 4.6 (as well as the proof of Lemma 4.5). Thus the proofs we include are quicker. Our second and final case is, where l, m ≥ 1, and n ≥ 0,
In this case some instances are theorems of KT.
